This article treats an understudied subject in popular culture studies: the mutual feed between lifestyle cultures and marketing through an examination of the Bobo fever in urban China. How did an imaginary class "bourgeois bohemians" emerge in a country where the bourgeois base is statistically small and where the bohemian equation is non-existent? To shed light on this popculture-turned-marketing-fad syndrome, the article introduces the concept of the "neo-tribes" and maps the pathways that link style cultures to consumer segmentation.
elucidates so well in The Theory of the Leisure Class.
This essay deals with an understudied topic in the field of popular cultural studies, i.e., the mutual imbrication between lifestyle cultures and marketing. Marketing is often the missing link in suties of the relationship between popular culture and consumer culture. By concentrating on the Chinese Bobo discourse, I wish to accomplish two goals. The first is to examine the logic of market segmentation that fuels the engine of emulative spending. More specifically, an analysis of the proliferating tribal discourses in China will map the pathways that link lifestyle cultures to consumer segmentation. The second is to treat the Bobo discourse both as a pop cultural and a marketing phenomenon. I look at the contemporary mutation of the anthropological concept "tribe" into a new marketing term zu or zuqun ("neo-tribe") and the challenge this new term poses to the old notion of "subculture." I hope to demonstrate that without delimiting and naming the target segment for a product, the engine of emulation could not get started. That is because emulation is made possible through the consumer's identification with a given socio-cultural segment, or a given "tribe." To flesh out this "tribal" logic of consumerism, this essay takes us into the social space of distinction at the higher end of the consumption ladder in urban China. This is an imaginary space criss-crossed by various funny acronyms evolving around the concept of the "neo-tribes." We will meet the Chinese "Bobos"
and xin xin renlei (the "neo-neo-tribe") and examine the real and imaginary benchmarks for the membership for each tribe.
Indeed, if consumption is conceived as an upward spiral movement that progresses tier by tier, as I pointed out above, what do the upper echelons do? Sit on top of the ladder waiting for those below them to close up the ranks? That is hardly the case. An upscale marketer's job is largely defined by their tactics of hairsplitting those further up the social hierarchy into tiny market segments. Those niche segments serve to set themselves apart not only from mass consumers but also from each other. At first glance, the myriad "tribal" discourses now mushrooming in urban China seem nothing more than novel marketing strategies targeted at the newly affluent. However, whether marketers can create wants, as the 1960s mass culture critique would have us believe, is no simple question with a quick answer. Contemporary cultural producers themselves share no such faith in their power of controlling the mind of consumers as their counterparts in the early 1900s did. 6 As a society grows more affluent, successful marketing depends increasingly upon unearthing consumers' own preference and desire and then selling it back to them. The tribal logic, for instance, would have no purchase if it had not tapped into the existing anxieties of the socially privileged. What are their anxieties? To be caught up by the emulative mass consumers. That is to suggest, those further up on the social ladder, i.e., neo-tribes like the Bobos, play the game of differentiation as fervently as those down under. In consumerism, differentiation and emulation are two sides of the same coin. China is no exception.
The Bobo Fever
"These are highly educated folk who have one foot in the bohemian world of creativity and another foot in the bourgeois realm of ambition and worldly success. The members of the new information age elite are bourgeois bohemians. Or, to take the first two letters of each word, they are Bobos." A small café near Southeast University in Nanjing named itself Bobo Café, a perfect example of a second-tier city teeming with first-tier desires. There was at least one website Xici hutong (www.xici.net) that once posted a Bobo page and provided advice on how Bobos are supposed to act, on where to find them and how to become one. After answering some multiple choice questions (e.g., "Are you satisfied with your life?" and "what do you think of Italian fashion?"), web surfers could assess their own potential for being a Bobo. 9 In the capital, businessman Zhang Luzi opened the DIY@bobo Bar to provide a home for this new social group. There was also a short-lived Bobos Club in Beijing that sponsored lectures on fengshui and other topics related to "spirituality." The list goes on and on. A bobo marketing craze appeared in first, second, and third tier cities and an entertaining debate unfolded in the press and on the internet. In a few minutes, you will be enjoying a drink with your beloved under the moonlightover a few simple appetizers" 12 From category to category, from copy to copy, the word "Bobo" and its affinities delivered a single message: premium value. If you spot some tongue-in-cheek humor in the advertising copies above, be assured irony has no place in marketing plans in China. Chinese 
The Guangzhou Project: Searching Online for Bobo Prospects
The corporation in question, let us call it S Real Estate, is located in Guangzhou. It singled out Bobos as their target clients. To pare down advertising expenditure, the company relied on the Internet for promotions. They devised an elaborate communications plan: to identify the target segment and attract their attention, several online activities were launched simultaneously: A search for bobos in Guangzhou; a contest for the ten coolest bobos in Guangzhou; a web editorial called "Bobos and their poetic lives"; an online serialized story penned by a fictional bobo living in the S apartment complex -"Love soars on the wings of poetry: the confessions of a bobo"; (5) A FLASH animation site advertising the "happy life style of bobos" and the brand essence of the S apartments (i.e., happy life =freedom + wealth+ mindfulness).
The maximum impact of this communications plan can be gauged from the questionnaires for the online bobo search:
1. Are you looking for something cool about a refrigerator rather than its cooling function when you are shopping for one?
2. Are you one of those who often wear hiking boots and ski googles or some unconventional gears to work? 3. Will you be willing to give up your job at the drop of a hat and go to a far-off place for a month?
4. Do you feel that being single for the rest of your life is no big deal? 5. You are an atheist. But one day you fall in love and feel that it is God's will?
6. Isn't it unbearable if your living space does not give you a poetic sense of life?
7. Is it a torture to live in a place that looks just like any other place without a personality?
If you answer "yes" to any of the questions above, contact the S Corporation immediately. You are a prospective bobo qualified for some incentive awards comprised of a surprise gift and a complimentary day trip to the S apartment complex. And mind you, if you are interested in running for the "ten coolest bobo" championship in Guangzhou, all you have to do is to enter a prose writing contest by submitting the most "poetic" and "personality building" experience you have ever had. A selection panel will pass the verdict. The ten winners will be given the title of naming a lack is the fastest way to guarantee its quick rise in demand.
In Search of the "Middle Class"
The bourgeoisie question predictably elevated the Bobo discourse to a level of discussion to which only serious sociological researchers could respond. But the transition of a lifestyle topic into a sociological one had not occurred. Nor was the challenge posed by Life Weekly answered by cultural critics. By spring 2004, not many follow-up discussions on the controversy reached the public arena. One reason could be that the public's attention was diverted from the question of the "middle class" to the new benchmark for social stratification, namely, xiaokang (the "comparatively well-to-do," a cut below the middle class). Clearly, although South China has bigger stakes in promoting the discourse of the "middle class," the north and the rest of the country are drawn to xiaokang as a policy concept that is deemed more relevant for its less affluent population. entrepreneurs, technical skilled labor, and office workers, are labeled "white collar" professions.
Secondly, 24.6% are middle class by income. There is no standard mean for all the regions surveyed. Income gaps are huge between places. If national income index was used as the standard for social classification, then there would be some very odd results: those living in the metropolis whose economic condition is inferior would be categorized as "higher income earners," and those who are relatively wealthy in underdeveloped regions might be grouped into "low income earners." It is therefore necessary that the "mean" is calculated on regional rather than national basis. The survey areas were divided into six regions: developing cities, towns, and districts; the comparatively well developed towns, cities, and districts; underdeveloped cities, towns, and districts; developing villages and rural areas; well developed villages and rural areas;
and underdeveloped rural areas. The research team derived the average figure of an individual's monthly income region by region. Those whose income rose above the mean in each region were counted as the "middle class," those below the mean were not.
Thirdly, 35% of those surveyed are the middle class by standards of consumption and lifestyle. Like the income index, a universal standard for the "middle class lifestyle" is hard to define, let alone to achieve, in a country as culturally diverse as China. Li Chunling and her research team argue that with some exceptions seen among the middle-aged and young people in metropolises, "so-called middle class culture has not appeared in China." Since a specific standard of "cultural" consumption was absent, the researchers developed an elaborate point system for measuring each household's capacity for consuming medium-range and high end luxury goods. "Middle-class lifestyle goods" were divided into four categories, (1) necessity electric appliances (e.g., color TV, refrigerator, washing machine); (2) medium-level consumer goods (e.g., telephone, mobile phone, CD player, microwave, air-conditioner, etc.); (3) luxury goods (e.g., computer, camcorder, piano, motocycle); (4) 
Bobos as a Market Segment
In many regards, urban China is an endless fashion race trying to beat the escalating turnovers.
The protagonists came and went. But the marketers stayed. From probing the bobo fever as a popular cultural syndrome, this section moves on to examine it as a marketing phenomenon. In "Bobos have dreams. So they are easy targets. They can be easily moved by `concepts' and `storytelling'."
"Sell them the bobo spirit."
"Chinese society will witness an increasingly large affluent class. Although we will probably never be sure whether X or Y is a bobo, but we will surely see them display some Bobo characteristics such as a preoccupation with creativity and spiritual values." "Our marketing opportunities will rest on whether we can provide products with added values that transcend materialism. For instance, sell ambience and service at entertainment venues such as bars and restaurants."
"You can detect a new social tendency now. Business behavior must be wedded to cultural concepts. Only when competition takes place at a certain cultural height and at a spiritual level can you make your products stand out."
"Bobos value personal experiences. They like to be adventurers. But they are not iconoclasts. Nor are they opposed to being trendy. Their main value coincides with the core value of society. That's the fundamental reason why they are so successful. . . We should not associate boboism with a fad or with an act of rebellion. We should not look upon them as mere upstarts either. They don't ever rebel." However, the allure of alternative models such as Maffesoli's is seen to have a caveatit theorizes 'politics' away too readily. If the "optimum strategy" of the neo-tribes is "to tap into a number of lifestyles, adopting whichever one best fits the situation to hand," their irreverent energy appears to be utterly purposeless. Maffesoli should be given credit for mentioning that "the feeling of tribal belonging can be reinforced by technological developments." 30 But when he penned his theory of neo-tribalism in 1988, he hardly foresaw that technology itself could create a tribe of its own complete with a system of distinction that sounds alien even to the neo-tribes. In China, the neo-neo-tribe is the first generation that grew up in the internet chat rooms. Their counterparts in Japan are participants in a vibrant cell phone youth culture which has just begun to sweep urban China.
It is not a coincidence that the Chinese term xin xin renlei is a transliteration of the Japanese term shin shin jinrei introduced to the mainland via Hong Kong and Taiwan. This word is used almost synonymously with 'Generation X and Y' in Taiwan. In Japan, it refers to the post-second baby boomers generation who are in their late teens and early twenties. A discussion about the cross-border journey of a marketing concept is perhaps long over due for we cannot talk about the urban imaginary in one East Asian country without crossing national boundaries.
Indeed, the tribal logic in consumer culture is as much an inter-Asian phenomenon as it is
Chinese. The challenge is to work out how to trace its traffic when sources are mostly hearsay and of electronic origins. It is not within the scope of this essay to address the comparative question about the East Asian neo neo-tribes at length. To raise this subject, however, serves an immediate purpose: it is a reminder of the important link of marketing to our study of East Asian youth culture and consumer culture.
Chinese xin xin renlei
What is a Chinese neo neo-tribe like? A quick profile should confirm its parasitic existence with their counterparts in other Asian societies. Their knowledge about the past was channeled indirectly through movies, novels, and TV drama.
Their literary sensibility is nurtured in Japanese manga. This is a generation fed by `fast food culture' while they are growing up. Compared to the previous generation, they are much more independent, wilful, and self-centered. Their way of absorbing things is DIY (Do It Yourself).
Indoctrination and preaching find no place in their lives." Pinning them down to a consistent profile is difficult. Real-life xin xin renlei can be seen at China News online, exemplified by Xiaolong (Little Dragon) and Nina. 34 This is a generation known to care about nothing but "fashion," "hair styles," "computers gadgets," and "relationships." 35 But "fashion" here takes on a different meaning than what it means to the neo-tribes. It points to an attitude rather than glittering material objects.
We can debate to no end as to whether xin xin renlei's rebellious attitude is reminiscent of Hebdige's subculture paradigm or of Maffesoli's tribal logic. But I think the question of rebellion is a red herring. "Having fun" and "doing whatever I want to do" is the key to unlocking the enigma of the neo-neo-tribe. Another point of entry is technology. A "classic visual image of the neo-neo-tribe" is "a lone figure arching over a computer like a big shrimp." This profile is similar to that of China's neo-neo-tribe, and crazier and wilder than the Japanese shin shinjinrui, but they all share the same C-culture -cartoons, computers, comic books, and nintando games. They all speak and consume the same visual language. Based on those field observations, the brand personality for San Mig Light took shape quickly. He is a little guy who follows his own instinct, who does not give a damn for public opinion, a trickster guided by impulses rather than by the mind. A new mascot was born: Sammy.
When I first greeted that naughty little devil in a series of print ads for San Mig Light, I
saw him as an obnoxious male prankster and a highly gendered invention. However, that cartoon figure, juvenile and delinquent, appeals to the target consumers regardless of their gender. He is the "ultimate spontaneous animal" that lurks in the minds and hearts of the Hong Kong neo-neotribe, an unstoppable phenomenon. He is everywhere. Private Sammy moments are posted in public. The Sammy "virus" was unleashed openly on television, billboards, and print ads. 40 He popped up in stores, public lavatories, bars, and restaurants, on the streets, at MTR, as tattoos and stickers, any medium you name, braving the public, "I dare, do you?" He pees whenever he can't hold it; he turns off the light switch when passing by a lady's room; he moons at you and dares you to spank him; he farts purposefully in a crowded elevator; he releases himself in the washing machine when Mom is not home; he targets the urinal from a far distance; he shows love to a young girl by pushing her off a cliff. Scatological humor is his trade mark. The tag lines feature Sammy-style outbursts: "Come on, man!" "Hey man, that's fun." "Maybe we don't need to take things that seriously." He is in our face, asking, "will you be Sammy enough when you are allowed to? "
If you feel timid answering those challenges, you are simply not a Hong Kong neo-neotribe, but you may still qualify for its Chinese or Japanese incarnations. We can find Sammy's golden mean, namely, "[my] only rule is to bend the rules, disruptively but not destructively,"
performed by his counterparts in China, Japan, and perhaps in other parts of Asia. This is, in short, the rise of a hot East Asian youth cultural phenomenon.
This article begins with the bobos, an imaginary class, ends with the neo-neo-tribe, a reallife social segment. I have yet to spot a TV commercial that captures the dual traits of the Chinese Bobos, namely, they have to practice both one-upmanship and an imaginary onedownmanship at the same time. Such real-life specimens are rare, to say the least. In contrast, the visual representation of xin xin renlei flooded the media precisely because it is a tribe rooted in the real. The arrival and popularity of both discourses, however, is a sure sign of the tribalization of the Chinese market. The theorem of the tribal discourse aside, however, two other important questions were raised in this article. While no quick answers can be found, the taste versus class question and the theoretical possibility of an emerging global youth culture point to the heart of my critical concern: the importance of taking "marketing" into serious account in any study of regional and transnational popular cultural trends. As shown above, marketers only need to take a tiny step to turn a popular discourse about a tribe into a new marketing phenomenon. And one can certainly argue the opposite. Indeed, it is difficult to tell which comes first --a real-life tribe or its incarnation as a market segment. Either way, when marketing meets culture, can a new pop culture movement be far away?
End Notes 1.This article is an excerpt from my book manuscript Brand New China: Advertising, Consumerism, and the Production of Commercial Culture. The original book chapter was first presented at the "Urban Imaginaries" international conference at Lingnan University, Hong
